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Since the 1960’s, histories of the American Revolution and Georgian Britain have 
often been provincial in focus, examining local rather than imperial issues. Recently, 
however, there has been a return to studying the Atlantic world as a whole, building on 
the work done by scholars such as Jack M. Sosin and Michael Kammen, who focused on 
the political and economic influence of colonial agents as part of the institutional empire. 
A second wave of this type of history, particularly new British literature, is now looking 
at questions of identity and examining immigrants, slaves, and London merchants in a 
social context. By looking at Great Britain and the American colonies in conjunction with 
the larger British Atlantic Empire, historians can better understand the political, social, 
and cultural transformations that occurred when transatlantic actors met. However, the 
agents—one of the most politically astute groups integral to the management of the 
institutional empire—have been virtually ignored by these developments. The 
correspondence of Connecticut agent William Samuel Johnson (1727-1819) allows a re-
evaluation of developments in the field since Kammen and Sosin, particularly on the 
issue of identity in the British Atlantic Empire. While there have been studies on famous 
agents and future Founding Fathers like Benjamin Franklin, it is just as necessary to take 
into account lesser-known agents, as well as those who differed in opinion from the 
Patriot elites.  
William Samuel Johnson is an example of an “ordinary” agent who nonetheless 
had extensive contacts with numerous British and American thinkers. While acting on 
Connecticut’s behalf in London between 1767 and 1771, he sent reports back to 
Connecticut governors Jonathan Trumbull and William Pitkin on parliamentary 
proceedings while corresponding with the people who traveled around the Atlantic world 
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during this critical period—merchants, seafarers, emigrants, soldiers, missionaries, 
radicals and conservatives, reformers, and politicians. As an Anglican who believed in 
political moderation, Johnson sought common ground and engaged with loyalists and 
Patriots, Tories and Whigs, and formed firm friendships with English elites across the 
political spectrum. His correspondents included both the pro-American merchant 
Nicholas Ray as well as the pro-government minister Benjamin LaTrobe.  
He is also representative of the late eighteenth-century empire writ large. Agents, 
who had once been a source of stability in the far-flung colonies, became a destabilizing 
force as confusion and conflict grew over conceptual ideas of what constituted “the 
empire” and who was included in it. Johnson was a sane observer in the midst of the 
ideological and administrative upheaval of the 1760’s and 1770’s. His subsequent 
loyalism and political obscurity during the war years was in many ways a result of his 
attempts to reconcile various factional interests during his tenure as an agent. Finally, his 
eventual “redemption” and reintegration into the political fabric of the early United 
States—first as a Senator and signer of the US Constitution, then as president of 
Columbia University—points towards a recognition of his service and acceptance of a 
new conceptual framework for understanding the Atlantic world.  
 J.H. Elliott has written in an essay, “English history and American history have all 
too often gone their separate ways, without any consistent or sustained dialog between 
the two. Now…the mid-Atlantic is a good place to meet.”1 This paper will take a 
comparative approach, taking into account both local issues in Connecticut and London 
as well as the systems that connected them together. This will be a study in the vein of 
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what David Armitage terms “trans-Atlantic history,” or, “the history of the Atlantic world 
told through comparisons.”2 This methodology yields answers to questions about the 
character and transformation of the disparate territories of the Atlantic world, through the 
lens of an agent who was at the center of the debate. The first part of the paper will 
discuss the successes and failures of the agents as a whole. The second part will examine 
the relationships formed and the rhetoric exchanged between British and American 
radicals, who often used the same terminology of liberty and yet had profound gaps in 
their worldviews. Thirdly, I will analyze the rift between the colonial, provincial 
understanding of the empire (as loose, self-governing entities each with separate 
allegiances to the Crown) and the metropolitan understanding of centralized power in 
London, based on the constitutional authority of Parliament.3 Finally, I will evaluate the 
burgeoning nationalism in the Anglo-American world. If England, Scotland, Wales, 
Ireland, and the American colonies were all seen as constituting separate entities within 
the empire, it is important to explain how and when the colonies fell beyond the 
“boundaries” of British national identity.4  
At the same time, however, I acknowledge that William Samuel Johnson and his 
correspondents were, fundamentally, cogs in an interconnected system that they could not 
necessarily see. Trying to explain complex theoretical and ideological shifts in thinking is 
somewhat lacking when overlaid onto a real historical figure’s life. Johnson, although 
highly knowledgeable, informed, articulate, and insightful, had his own preoccupations 
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and biases. What he mentions as well as does not mention about these issues has equal 
significance. Admittedly he also represents an elite, Anglicized point of view, and does 
not speak for the general public, although his ideas do reflect the dominant narrative of 
his society. Despite the shortcomings inherent in looking at what remains of a person’s 
correspondence, “by stressing intentionality or agency, biography should allow the 
historian to see how individuals react to invisible forces.”5 Johnson was an individual 
with both remarkable intentionality and yet little real authority. His career path differed 
sharply from agents such as Benjamin Franklin, who were radicalized by the American 
independence movement and were therefore compromised in their negotiations with 
Parliament. In contrast, Johnson was first and foremost an imperial agent who found his 
loyalties tested as the colonists and British government acted with increasing 
immoderation.  
As a link between the two sides, however, Johnson was part of a dying breed and 
men like him were shunted aside as tensions mounted. P.D.G. Thomas even asserted that 
the agents became “obsolete” after the repeal of the Stamp Act.6 Certainly by the time 
Johnson left to go home to Stratford in 1771, diplomacy was left in the hands of 
increasingly radical men like Franklin. Although he did his best to reconcile various 
factions and provide an accurate account of the powerful nationalistic forces gathering on 
both sides of the Atlantic on the eve of the American Revolution, the agents’ collective 
failures as transatlantic mediators helped bring about the collapse of an imperial 
community. This disintegration had dramatic effects on the whole of the Atlantic world.  
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“Agent, an American born, who sees and feels the worth of Liberty”7 
Agents had been an integral part of the imperial Atlantic system since the early 
seventeenth century. As the position of the agent developed, they were given increased 
responsibilities and became important lobbyists and mediators in the governance of the 
colonies. Most of the agents had backgrounds in law and politics, and a large part of their 
duties centered on negotiating colony finances and regulating trade. Initially colonial 
agents went to London for specialized missions, but the eighteenth century saw the 
establishment of a bureaucracy of agents permanently stationed in London. Like other 
Enlightenment intellectuals, they frequented coffeehouses and moved in elite circles. 
Often colonial assemblies would assign special agents to settle land disputes with 
Native American tribes. Johnson was an agent of this type. By profession and training a 
lawyer, and also active in Connecticut politics, in 1766 the General Assembly appointed 
him as a special agent representing Connecticut to the Privy Council. The dispute 
concerned lands deeded to the Mason family by the Mohegan Indians, which the General 
Assembly refused to ratify. The Masons then decided to place their claim before the 
Privy Council. Johnson would assist the regular agent, Englishman Richard Jackson. His 
stay in London was supposed to be short and focused on resolving the Mohegan case in 
favor of the colony. Instead, he remained there for five years.  
  The role of the agent was undergoing great administrative change during the 
1760’s. The Seven Years’ War and the abandonment of salutary neglect increased their 
importance and broadened the scope of their activities beyond the Board of Trade and 
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into Parliament, where they used their position to influence legislation. In a shift from the 
past, increasingly many of the agents were not colonists, but British civil servants.8 Of 
course, most of them had ties on both sides of the Atlantic, or had lived for several years 
in the colonies. The agents representing their home colonies, however—notably 
Benjamin Franklin, Jared Ingersoll, and William Samuel Johnson—felt a strain on their 
dual loyalties to their provincial governments and the central government in London by 
the end of the 1760’s. This was a period of contradictions: at the height of the agents’ 
importance and cooperation as a group, the colonial assemblies constrained their efforts 
by failing to provide instructions, authority, and funds.  
In evaluating the conduct and successes of the agents as a whole, historians have 
asked two fundamental questions: how effective were they, and was their effectiveness 
hampered by the radical behavior of the colonists? Did this radicalization then cause 
them to misrepresent the situation in England to their constituents back home? Did they 
misrepresent the situation in America to Parliament? These questions have divided 
historians, and admit of no easy answers. In Agents and Merchants: British Colonial 
Policy and the Origins of the American Revolution, 1763-1775, Sosin concluded that 
although the agents ultimately failed in their responsibilities, they did succeed in several 
important areas, such as securing the repeal of the Stamp Act in the 1760’s.9 Sosin 
attributed the repeal of the act to the arbitration of the agents rather than colonial 
pressure, but also noted that the agents were united with London merchants and dealing 
with a confused, divided British government. Thomas asserted that the Stamp Act repeal 
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was more the result of the political change of administration from Grenville to 
Rockingham, based on economic considerations, than because of any protest on the part 
of the colonists, merchants, or agents.10 These favorable conditions would not be repeated 
in the 1770’s, when merchant support withered and the North ministry came into power 
and exerted tighter control.  
The colonists also sometimes had a different agenda than their agents. During the 
1760’s, according to Sosin, colonial leaders did not listen to the advice of their agents and 
through their agitation confirmed to Parliament and the British public that they were 
seeking independence rather than the repeal of specific acts.11 The colonists certainly did 
not listen to Johnson’s advice from his British friends not to publicize the Non-
Importation agreements. The agents, Sosin argued, were desperately trying to avoid the 
issue of parliamentary sovereignty, but their effectiveness was “seriously impaired and 
their position in British government circles jeopardized by political animosities in the 
colonies…linked with the developing revolutionary challenge to imperial authority.”12 
Johnson experienced the difficulty in acting without his constituents’ express permission; 
the agents wanted to draw up a petition to Parliament silent on the issue of the right to tax 
the colonies, but feared that it would be misconstrued as a “ground of declaration that the 
Colonies had, by their Agents, in effect receded from their claim of exemption from 
Parliamentary taxation as of right.”13 By the 1770’s colonial governments recalled agents 
with conciliatory views and ties with those in power (like Johnson) and replaced them 
with agents aligned with the independence movement. Sosin highlighted the close 
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relationship between merchants and agents, at least in the 1760’s, and blamed the 
breakdown of relations primarily on the colonists and the administration. The agents, on 
the other hand, were true metropolitan figures.  
When examining the actions of the colonists and Parliament, however, Sosin 
neglected to take into account that the agents were the primary source of news and 
channel of intelligence for colonial governments. Therefore, the agents must bear some 
responsibility for the failure to bring about a reconciliation and compromise. This is the 
view of Kammen in A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the 
American Revolution. In contrast to Sosin, who emphasized cooperation and connection, 
Kammen argued that the agents actually helped facilitate and increase the separation 
between Britain and the colonies. Their correspondence “fed the hungry discontented 
with provocative and sometimes distorted views that seemed to vindicate their own 
deepest suspicions…they reinforced the agitated provincials’ sense of alienation from 
Parliament and the Empire.”14 This is a bold assertion. It is certainly true that radical 
agents like Franklin (particularly towards the end of his tumultuous tenure in London) did 
abandon neutrality and voice his outright support for independence. He was certainly 
intentionally provocative. However, this was not the case for the majority of agents, 
though perhaps the restless and angry colonists overstated their honest appraisals of the 
political atmosphere in London.  
In his personal letters and official reports to the governors, Johnson himself 
provided not only moderate opinions but plenty of ammunition against Parliament. His 
intention was never to deepen the chasm between the two countries, but his 
correspondence did reinforce discontent in the Connecticut assembly. Kammen 
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overstated his case, however, when he argued that there was a significant break in the 
connection between the agents and the English, leading to a “waning influence of 
America and Americans in London.”15 Johnson, for example, does not fit Kammen’s 
model. On the contrary, whatever his own views were, and whatever he reported back to 
the colonies, the ties he formed in England proved to be the deciding factor in forestalling 
his political radicalization, culminating in his loyalist sympathies during the war. For 
Johnson, who left England in 1771 but remained in contact with numerous friends, his 
experience as an agent separated him from the provincial views of most other colonial 
leaders.  
 
“An almost desperate game”16 
The political turmoil and partisan politics in Parliament meant that the Mohegan 
case was not high on the government’s list of priorities.17 American affairs, too, 
distracted Johnson from the case. His attention was supposed to be focused on a specific 
case concerning a single colony, but instead he unexpectedly found himself as an 
advocate of American rights in general. As frustrating as he found the delay of the case, 
he spent his time wisely, acting as the eyes and ears for his employers. As Governor 
William Pitkin reassured him, “The Intelligence you are from time to time favouring me 
with, you may well conclude is acceptable in this critical Day. An attentive Ear, a 
watchful Eye, and a calm judicious Pen, are often helpful to others, in forming a 
Judgment, and regulating their Conduct.”18 For the most part this is an accurate 




 William Samuel Johnson to William Pitkin, January 3, 1769, WSJ Papers.  
17
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description of Johnson, who certainly had an attentive ear and watchful eye, if not always 
a calm, judicious pen. Because Johnson gave intelligence during the critical upheavals 
leading to the American Revolution, he was aware of the worth of his observations:  
I am very happy for the intelligence I am able to transmit home and attention to 
the interests of the Colonies gives many satisfactions while continuing here. I 
shall ultimately leave no stone unturned to discern as far as possible all the doings 
and Intentions, views, and connections of those who have it in their power to 
befriend or injure us, as well as to prevent as far as I am able any Mischief that 
may be designed us.19  
 
Preventing that mischief, though, was a challenge. Johnson arrived in London 
shortly after the agents had reached the pinnacle of success in repealing the Stamp Act. 
By the time he left, the agents’ heyday was over, their power and influence on a rapid 
decline.20 They, along with merchants, were figures that bound the British Atlantic 
community together, but despite these connections (as well as political sway within 
Parliament itself), Johnson held little actual power himself. At best, he could work with 
the other agents to petition Parliament, try to sway popular opinion in the colonies’ favor, 
and try to exert influence through dealings with sympathetic MP’s. In addition, the agents 
faced two difficult problems. Firstly, they had to carefully guard the privacy of their work 
to maintain both their popularity back home and their trustworthiness in the eyes of 
Parliament. Secondly, they had to accurately report parliamentary proceedings in an 
extremely hostile and precarious environment.   
Johnson was sensible of the delicacy of his position. In a postscript to Governor 
Pitkin, he reminded him,  
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Though with regard to myself I believe it perfectly needless, yet it may not 
perhaps be amiss to mention to you, that very great offence has been taken here at 
the frequent publication in America of extracts of letters from agents and others 
residing here, especially when they have taken the liberty to mention the names of 
great persons in or out of administration. This has not often been done in 
Connecticut, and I doubt not all proper prudence will be used with respect to 
everything of this kind.21  
 
Johnson’s emphasis on secrecy and propriety extended even to private letters to his 
father. His fears were not misplaced. Perhaps he was thinking of the troubles faced by his 
close friend and fellow agent Jared Ingersoll two years before. Even though Ingersoll had 
petitioned Parliament against the legislation while in London, the people of Connecticut 
reviled him for his role as a Stamp Act distributor. After a mob attacked him and 
demanded that he resign his post, The Connecticut Gazette published some of his private 
papers, forcing him to make the entire correspondence public in order to prove his 
allegiance to the colony. As a further precaution, he suspended all correspondence to 
England. Privately, he wrote to Johnson that “in private Letters altho’ there should be 
nothing wicked or offensive you know how disagreeable it must be to have ones own 
most free thoughts like tete a tete Conversations proclaimed aloud on house tops.”22  
Indiscretions also made life difficult for agents. In 1774, Benjamin Franklin 
procured the private letters of Massachusetts lieutenant governor Thomas Hutchinson and 
secretary Andrew Oliver, which implicated them in urging Parliament to take a tough 
stance against the colony (without the knowledge of the agents). He sent them to Thomas 
Cushing and they spread to several Massachusetts patriots, who immediately printed 
copies and made them public to the Massachusetts government. The outcry against 
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Franklin in England was considerable, and the scandal “effectively curtailed Franklin’s 
agency…his usefulness as a public lobbyist was at an end.”23 Johnson seems to have 
anticipated this, warning Trumbull that  
Indeed, all the correspondence with America is now so narrowly watched, and so 
much umbrage is taken at the communication of anything, either in point of fact 
or opinion, that they are pleased to call improper, that it is become more than ever 
necessary for all on this side to request of their friends the utmost degree of 
caution with respect to whatever they write, for this obvious reason amongst 
many others, lest by exposing them they occasion their being so guarded against 
as to render it impossible for them to obtain the intelligence they would wish to 
have communicated. Some imprudences of this kind in some of the other 
Colonies have been very prejudicial.24  
 
Nonetheless, Johnson did his best to uncover what was going on in Parliament 
even when he, as an American, was not welcome. For instance, he related to Ingersoll 
how he managed to “slip in at the last debate” in Parliament over a proposed tax on tea 
and the Mutiny Act in New York, even though “the American agents were expressly 
ordered not to be admitted.”25 He managed to “escape” before being found out. The 
agents faced other difficulties beyond a lack of access. Johnson did not have an esteemed 
view of the parliamentary system and how it functioned in the late 1760’s. The 
government went through several changes of ministries, and Johnson noted the 
prevalence of party politics and a focus on electioneering. Parties, he believed, “threaten 
a dissolution of the whole political system, and the ruin of the empire.”26 Johnson was 
equally suspicious of the motives of the Whigs and Tories. The only bright side he saw 
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was that MP’s spent most of their time campaigning and raising massive funds for 
elections, and therefore were too busy to cause more trouble towards the colonies.  
Perhaps many of the disputes between Britain and the colonies arose due to the 
confusing and indecisive nature of Parliament’s often ad hoc policies. Before discussing 
how Parliament was arguing over whether acquisitions made by the East India Company 
should belong to the company or the government, as well as debating a new tax on tea 
and china and figuring out how to respond to New York’s refusal to billet troops, Johnson 
acknowledged that the complexity of British politics hindered him from providing useful 
intelligence: 
Such has been the confusion amongst the Ministers in this country, and so great 
the uncertainty with respect to all public measures since I came here, that I have 
been in fear to write you at all upon public affairs, lest I should mislead, and give 
wrong notions; or lest, if I should give you the best intelligence that could be 
collected in the morning, the whole face of things should be changed before 
evening, and it would become necessary to contradict one day what I had wrote 
you on the other. Either the designs of government and their system is too 
complex, deep, and close to be discovered, not by my very weak and feeble 
penetration only, but by the whole body (and they are certainly a very numerous 
and respectable one) of those who are endeavoring, not only to discover, but 
many of them to counteract them too; or else they have very little design, and act 
without a plan, and only from the varying appearances as they arise…I fear it is 
rather the latter.27 
 
Johnson entered a political milieu that was highly politicized, and he despaired of ever 
divining the true intentions of the administration towards the colonies. He eventually 
came to the conclusion that neither party was concerned with the colonies’ benefit, and 
that any support would come “so far as may serve the purposes of pure opposition, not 
upon the great principles upon which we stand.”28 Johnson had a particularly astute 
understanding of politics; though the Rockingham Whigs claimed to be “friends of 
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America” based on their opposition to the Stamp Act and efforts in securing its repeal, 
they insisted it was a matter of expediency and supported the passage of the Declaratory 
Act. The Chathamites similarly made claims that were not borne out by legislation like 
the Townsend Acts.29 Johnson’s assessment of Lord Hillsborough, head of American 
affairs, was that he was a smooth-talking courtier, not a true ally despite his “pompous 
declarations of affection for the Colonies.”30 Americans, Johnson concluded, could not 
rely on parliamentary or ministerial machinations. They had to rely on themselves. 
During the first two years of his agency, then, Johnson had fuelled the flames of 
resentment against the government in his reports to the governors. However, as he began 
to make contacts and friendships with those in England, his ideology shifted towards his 
eventual loyalist position.  
 
“I persuade myself I have made a friendship with you”31 
“America has few friends” in London, wrote Johnson to Pitkin in 1767.32 Yet at 
the same time he was reporting Parliament’s rhetoric against the colonies, he was forming 
partnerships and deep friendships with British radical thinkers and taking up a lively 
correspondence with those who questioned British imperialism in both North America 
and India. Johnson intended to make contacts with politicians from all sides of the 
political spectrum. As he admitted to Pitkin, discerning Parliament’s intentions towards 
America could be confusing “owing, I am sensible, to the different company I converse 
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with (and I choose to mix with some of both kinds).”33 He repeatedly made efforts to 
ingratiate himself with Lord Hillsborough on Connecticut’s behalf. Like many agents, his 
own reputation hindered his success. Years later a British friend confessed that 
Hillsborough “had for a long time taken you for an Independent, and as one who was as 
violent in the opposition as most of the Americans were, that as this was a general 
opinion, you was not so much attended to touching your person as you should have 
been.”34 Hillsborough and the other ministers feared that an independence movement had 
begun to take root in the colonies. Hillsborough also seems to have had trouble 
understanding Johnson’s political views, since he (like most Americans) did not 
necessarily fit the Tory-Whig paradigm. Johnson’s difficulties were indicative of the 
constrained agency of the American-born agents as a whole. In addition, outright support 
for the American cause was not popular. Barlow Trecothick, a pro-American merchant 
and MP, found it difficult to get elected as the mayor of London due to his American 
sympathies.  
As much as he tried to make contacts with those unfriendly towards the colonies’ 
interests, most of Johnson’s friendships developed with people who shared similar views. 
His social circle encompassed a surprisingly large radius, and he found a significant 
number of “Friends of America” outside the parliamentary system (notwithstanding 
Trecothick, Barre, and others). These included the country gentry, not usually considered 
a major demographic of colonial support. Yet Johnson wrote that  
I have had the great pleasure, also, in several excursions I have made into the 
country in the course of the summer, to find that the cause of the Colonies has 
gained ground among the country gentlemen and the bulk of the substantial 
people, as it had before done in the city;--with many, I believe, from a rational 
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conviction of the justice and equity of our claims; with more, perhaps, from 
apprehensions of the loss of those emoluments which they have derived from our 
connection with them.35 
 
Although Johnson contradicted himself here, complaining about the condescending 
treatment of Americans in London, but then (perhaps too optimistically) reporting of 
widespread support in the countryside, he was cynical enough to ascribe this support 
partly to commercial motives.  
 A particular country gentleman and friend was James Theobald, the owner of the 
country estate Waltham Place, in Berkshire. In 1768 Theobald wrote to Johnson to 
“favour me with any particular occurrences that may happen relating to our North 
American friends, the Sons of Liberty, as I am unhappily situated among a set of 
neighbours who are for correcting them for what they call Disobedience, though its my 
opinion that their perseverance will in the end be the saving of this Country from 
slavery.”36 Johnson was not only a conduit for news heading back to the colonies, but a 
source of information for interested supporters in England. Though Johnson was in 
London at the time, Theobald apparently thought him well-informed enough to provide 
accurate information from his contacts back in Connecticut, another way in which agents 
occupied the space been popular politics and traditional political influence. Johnson 
replied to Theobald,  
 
Your worthy neighbors I fear do not know the true state of things in their Country. 
They would surely not correct Chilson for Complaining and Remonstrating 
against any attacks upon essential Liberties, much less for maintaining those 
Principles of Liberty which they have been taught both by the precepts and 
example of this Country. They only wish to be as free as Englishmen are sought 
to be and to their equality in the Commonwealth of Britain, as your friends would 
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not deny them this, and they ask no more. To enslave one part of the Empire is to 
prepare slavery for the whole.37 
 
Johnson’s postscript showed his pride in his identity as an Englishman and his 
inclusion into the Empire and Commonwealth. Furthermore, he made it clear that a 
rupture of liberties in one part of the Empire would signal a lack of liberty in other 
parts—even Britain. These sentiments were perfectly in line with his other observations. 
Although he was often circumspect in his official reports, to his father he reflected on the 
high levels of poverty and the gap between the rich and poor in the country, and noted 
that  
But alas! Amidst all this Magnificence how many things are amiss! Irreligion, 
Luxury, Dissipation, Fashion, Consumption, Vice, & Villainy are making horrible 
inroads, and unless corrected threatens to prostrate their Glory in the dust. The 
Vices of the Nation amaze you, while their splendor dazzles you—when you 
consider the Grandeur, Wealth, and Power of this People, they seem to be 
superior to everything and permanent as the Mountains; when you contemplate 
their Irreligion, their Factions, & their Vices they seem hastening to sudden & 
irretrievable destruction, and one is astonished that they exist. I have a thousand 
things to say to you upon the state of things here both Civil & Religious which 
would be endless to write & many of them improper to trust to Paper.38  
 
This is a theme taken up by British radicals: that England had lost sight of its republican 
principles, and the conflict with America was both a symptom and cure. 
 
“The spirit of liberty is well-awakened, and in full glow here”39 
Radical thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic often exchanged ideas, support, and 
arguments in favor of increased political liberty. They often used the same vocabulary 
and shared a tradition of constitutional rights. Historian Eliga Gould writes that they were 
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both proud of the freedom enjoyed in the British Atlantic world.40 However, American 
leaders often “overestimated British radical influence in England,” in large part due to 
reports from agents like Johnson.41 Merchants, for instance, were instrumental in 
repealing the Stamp Act, but acted primarily out of economic considerations and became 
less interested as their focus shifted to trade in the East Indies.  
However, London merchants did have influence with American agents; one of 
Johnson’s most important correspondents was the staunchly pro-American merchant 
Nicolas Ray. Ray grew up in Boston, but, exhibiting the mobility of the age, moved 
permanently to London at age twenty-one. He was a British correspondent with the New 
York Sons of Liberty. In this and in other matters he was more radical than Johnson, who 
did not approve of the Son’s extremism and considered them a mob (based on fearful 
reports from loyalist friends). As a merchant and emigrant, Ray held close commercial 
and sentimental ties to the colonies, and was strongly in favor of the non-importation 
agreements. Ray’s status as a merchant in part drove his radical ideology. Continuing his 
correspondence with Johnson into the 1770’s, when Johnson had returned to Connecticut, 
Ray warned about the dangers of imperialism and luxury, which was a common focus of 
critique in the late eighteenth century.42 In his view,  
England at present, Excells both Greece and Rome in Barbarity, Inhumanity & 
every Species of Villainy in India in pursuit of plunder…So that it is clear to me 
Asia by its Immaginary Wealth will strip this Kingdom of its Liberty. For these 
reasons I am determin’d to be no ways concerned in defusing or scattering the 
baneful goods of India tha’o the Collonies, & for this Resolution I am sure I have 
your applause. You I think are of the Legislature, is it not possible to bring such 
                                                 
40
 Eliga H. Gould, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 3.  
41
 Robert E. Toohey, Liberty and Empire: British Radical Solutions to the American Problem, 1774-1776 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1978), 143.  
42
 J.C.D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832: Political discourse and social dynamics in the Anglo-
American world (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 24.  
 19 
goods in disrepute and the wearer of them contemptible whilst those of your own 
make should be Respectable and Honorable.43  
 
Johnson responded by praising homespun and the efforts of local manufactures within 
Connecticut. Ray was equally critical of Parliament, particularly the way wealth could 
“buy” seats and votes, noting that European states, particularly England, are “allow’d 
tha’o parliaments to put on their own chains, which, by being neatly filed & polish’d, 
they would persuade the people are not chains Till they are Effectually Rivetted…”44 Ray 
contrasted this favorably to the obscurity, self-reliance, and lack of legislative corruption 
in the colonies, casting himself as someone who has seen “Tyranny and Slavery Tread 
underfoot the Natural Libertys of Mankind” in Europe and Johnson as someone living “in 
a colony where the Libertys of Mankind are better understood and Enjoyed than in any 
other spot on Earth.”45  
Seven years earlier, in 1766, Ray had published a pamphlet entitled “The 
Importance of the Colonies of North America, and the Interests of Great Britain with 
regard to them, Considered, Together with Remarks on the Stamp Duty.” In it he touched 
on many of the same themes, particularly American freedoms compared to Europe, but 
made the mercantilist argument that the colonies should focus on trade, centered around 
Britain, rather than developing their industry. It is significant that only a few years later 
he praises the non-importation agreements, recommends that the colonies cut off all 
foreign trade, and even suggests that it would be better for the colonies if Philadelphia, 
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New York, and Boston were all destroyed.46 Ray had become radicalized between 1766 
and 1774.  
Johnson, although warning the colonies not to loudly broadcast non-importation, 
saw their united firmness in the economic boycott as the only means to preserve public 
morality and guarantee parliamentary compliance. When the agreement fell through in 
1770, he recognized that this would be a sign to Parliament that their coercive measures 
were working and would eventually force the colonies into obedience. Worse, it 
discouraged their European supporters. “Is this, it is said, your American firmness? Are 
these the examples you give us of your fortitude, your patriotism and perseverance?” 
Johnson wrote in disgust. “The eyes of all Europe were turned towards America, and on 
the issue of this controversy was to be formed their idea of your character. It is done; 
your character is now fixed; you will make a very contemptible figure in the eyes of all 
mankind, and disgrace the fair page of history.”47 America had failed to live up to the 
claims of European supporters like Ray.  
Though Johnson readily admitted that the British ideology of liberty informed 
American ideas of liberty, he hesitated to attribute influence in the opposite direction and 
denied any American influence on popular British politics and reform movements. A 
critic of the popular John Wilkes, Johnson believed him to be as partisan, self-serving, 
and hypocritical as other politicians. Like British “Real” Whigs, the colonists supported 
the Wilkite cause and saw Wilkes’s struggle for an expansion of representative 
government reflected in their own struggle for representation.48 Johnson, however, 
pragmatically concluded that Wilkes would only support the colonies if it was in his own 
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self interest. He decried how Wilkes stirred up the violent passions of the people, who 
rioted after he was jailed, complaining that “I have the mortification to hear many 
perversely impute them to the example (as they say) set in the Colonies, and the debility 
discovered by the government here in yielding to them and repealing the Stamp Act, 
which (being so totally without any manner of foundation) only serves to show how very 
ready those who make observations are to turn every circumstance to the disadvantage of 
the Colonies.”49 Yet Johnson also recognized the deeper forces at work in the disturbance 
of the populace. He conceded that Wilkes, “accidentally not intentionally I fear” has 
released the “spirit of liberty” of people frustrated with both the king and Parliament.50 
Johnson put the blame for the disturbances in Boston and in London squarely on the 
shoulders of the ministry. Drawing the connection between the Middlesex election 
dispute and the situation in the colonies, he predicted a political revolution:  
They have now a great and very important constitutional question of 
representation to agitate, which nearly affects all their rights, and is not totally 
unconnected with that of the Colonies, who may perhaps derive some material 
advantage from this litigation. The subject has attracted the attention, and excites 
the expectations of all the people of England; and if the freeholders and those who 
have espoused their cause persevere with the same fervent zeal by which they 
seem at present to be animated, the affair may, perhaps, be attended with very 
serious consequences.51 
 
In fact, although the war initially forestalled parliamentary and commercial 
reforms, British and American interaction in this period laid the groundwork for future 
advancements. The war itself, along with the French Revolution, prompted a return to 
conservatism and the status quo, and set Britain more firmly on the path of heavy-handed 
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imperialism in India.52 However, progress was made in extraparliamentary issues such as 
the abolition of the slave trade and the resurgence of social reforms with the rise of 
evangelical Christianity.53 The swell of parliamentary criticism in this period also laid the 
groundwork for greater democratization in the 1830’s.54 The dire warnings of Ray, 
Theobald, and Johnson himself—that England was on a path to tyranny because of their 
conduct towards the colonies—proved unfounded, as they remained fixed on their system 
while recognizing that it needed reforms. The dialogue opened up by the convergence of 
colonial and metropolitan political thought reverberated not only in America but in 
Britain as well.  
 
“The Crown they reverence and love”55 
Recently, some historians have argued that Americans right up until the moment 
of revolution were more monarchical than their metropolitan counterparts, who were 
justly proud of the supremacy of Parliament over absolute monarchy.56 For the colonies, 
however, it was the king who bound them to the Empire. Brendan McConville argues that 
“before the Revolution, Americans wanted more patriarchy and more empire, not less, 
and strangely, such desires…helped unravel the imperial state.”57 The Empire meant 
access to commerce all around the Atlantic. It meant protection by a benevolent monarch, 
safeguarding liberties and Protestantism. It meant a shared heritage and a common 
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identity. However, the “British Atlantic Empire” was an ideological construct rather than 
an inherent, real institution.58 The provincial American view—of loose, self governing 
entities bound by commerce and loyalty to the monarch—did not correspond with the 
metropolitan understanding of the empire, with constitutional and parliamentary 
supremacy centralized on the metropolitan center, London.59 Hillsborough pejoratively 
termed the American system “polytheism in politics…fatal to the constitution.”60 
Furthermore, while the two parts of the empire shared a common heritage of liberty, it 
differed sharply between “American popular sovereignty” and “British parliamentary 
sovereignty.”61 Not only was authority not vested in the same governmental body, there 
was disagreement over how many “bodies” there should be.  
The “American conception of empire,” which posed a challenge to Parliament’s 
claims of absolute authority, came to a head in the debate over taxation without 
representation. British politicians saw it as a civil dispute; to Americans, the issue was as 
much about parliamentary sovereignty as it was about taxation. This kind of rhetoric was 
present in many of the petitions that colonial governments sent to the king, and was 
popular in pamphlets and propaganda as well. In a somewhat sycophantic petition to 
Hillsborough, Governor Pitkin made the odd claim that Parliament’s taxes deprive the 
colonies of “making a free Gift…or voluntarily complying with any Requisition of our 
rightful Lord and Sovereign” in bearing some of the financial burdens for the Seven 
                                                 
58
 David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 195.  
59
 Eliga H. Gould, “Fears of War, Fantasies of Peace: British Politics and the Coming of the American 
Revolution,” in Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World, ed. Eliga H. Gould 
and Peter S. Onuf (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 24-5.  
60
 Johnson to Pitkin, January 3, 1769, WSJ Papers. 
61
 Toohey, 153.  
 24 
Years’ War.62 His argument, that only the king has the authority to tax the colonies 
according to their royal charters, was common. Johnson put it succinctly in a letter to 
Pitkin in 1768: “You are loyal only to the king, you are not so to the Parliament.”63  
This larger debate played out in microcosm when in 1768 Johnson was granted an 
audience with Lord Hillsborough, who had been put in charge of American affairs earlier 
that year. Johnson tried to assure Hillsborough of Connecticut’s tranquility and loyalty, 
but inadvertently entangled himself in a debate. In particular, he tried to convince 
Hillsborough that the charter granted to Connecticut by Charles II gave it the authority to 
make legislation for itself, rather than be subject to Parliament. Hillsborough did not 
agree, and Johnson bemoaned how little the ministers knew of the colonies, and the 
“loose, mistaken notions” great men in power had “of colony rights.”64  
These problems were particularly acute in the Mohegan case and in Johnson’s 
advice to the Susquehanna Company over their dispute with Pennsylvania. Johnson was 
frustrated with Mason for insisting that the Indians had not gotten justice from the 
colonial government, instead applying to the Privy Council. On one hand, in his list of 
arguments to the Privy Council, Johnson argued that Indians were “subjects of the 
Colony and as such of his Majesty.” On the other hand, he continued, “and the Treaty of 
1638 contains an express Subjugation to the laws of the Colony.” His main arguments, 
then, relied on the rights of the colony “by virtue of the charter.” In a letter to Trumbull 
concerning the Susquehanna Company’s claims to land in Pennsylvania, Johnson warned 
that if the colony took up the company’s claim it would “give much offense” and 
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“umbrage” in London.65 Parliament, he claimed, did not give credence to ancient 
charters. This posed a challenge to lawyers like Johnson who argued in the colony’s favor 
over land disputes with the Mohegans and Pennsylvania on the basis of the royal charter. 
Throughout the prolonged trial, Johnson never expressed much optimism that the Privy 
Council would ever decide in Connecticut’s favor, perhaps reflecting what he saw as a 
small example of the British government’s larger disdain for colonial rights.  
Perhaps, like many Americans, he was also becoming disillusioned with George 
III when he opened his letter to fellow American agent Jared Ingersoll with “Put not yr. 
trust in Parliaments nor in Princes if I was you I would assume for my Motto.”66 Many 
colonial governments, including Connecticut’s, sent petitions to the king and were 
dismayed to hear from their agents that the petitions were neither given to the king nor 
even acknowledged. Although Hillsborough repeatedly reassured Johnson that the king 
cared for all his subjects, including Americans, Johnson never fully trusted him. Just as 
he and Hillsborough could not see eye to eye, disagreement over this fundamental issue 
would prove insurmountable in the decade leading up to revolution. With condemnation 
rather than support from the king, Americans turned against him, portraying him as a 
tyrant to delegitimize his rule and provide a justification for independence. 
Divergent British and American understandings of empire closely connected to 
two different conceptualizations of national identities. Americans steadfastly viewed 
themselves as English subjects, integral to the functioning of the Empire.67 Loyalist 
Nathan Whiting clearly viewed revolutionary discontent in America and England as 
being part of a single, large system: “The times look very gloomy & there seem to be 
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strong symptoms of a great revolution in the mighty Bh E—what will follow God only 
knows, America being part of the Empire and so connected with the head that any shock 
there must greatly affect it.”68 In his pamphlet Ray emphasized that “the Colonies are our 
Bretheren and fellow-Subjects, free-born Britons equally as we are, and entitled equally 
with every right and privilege of Britons.”69 Right up until 1776, this is in fact what the 
colonists were arguing themselves.  
At the same time, British identity was becoming increasingly geographically-
centered and restricted to the British Isles, with North America beyond the line of 
demarcation.70 Johnson seems to have had an intuitive grasp of the transforming identity 
politics. Prior to meeting Hillsborough, Johnson suggested to Pitkin that “as a native of 
Ireland…it may be hoped that he has formed reasonable notions of the rights and liberties 
of the distant branches of this empire, and would not be disposed to confine all power and 
all political felicity to the shores of this island.”71 Pitkin’s own realistic assessment of the 
situation was that “it is painfull to hear the Colonies compared to Ireland who are 
subjected by Conquest and by their Conduct forfeited those Immunities which we are 
justly Intitled to.”72 Pitkin saw identity as based on political rights, making the colonies 
more entitled to representation than Ireland. Ironically, this was the time—partly brought 
on by the imperial restructuring and conflict with the colonies—that a larger “British,” as 
opposed to solely English, identity began to emerge.73 Historian Eliga Gould concludes 
that with the American Revolution, “never again would the British think of any part of 
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their empire as an extension of their own nation—at least not in the way they had before 
1776.”74 
Historians have debated whether there was a corresponding emerging American 
patriotic nationalism prior to the war. J.C.D. Clark has argued that it did not exist, and 
that the ideology of liberty only “tied the colonists more firmly into the English Whig 
myth.”75 True American nationalism, then, would not arise until after independence, 
certainly not until 1776. He is correct in that the colonies understood their rights 
primarily in terms of their status as Englishmen. However, a definite—if inchoate—sense 
of a separate American identity was beginning to take root well before the Declaration of 
Independence. In a profession dominated by Englishmen, Pitkin was confident of 
Johnson’s success and that “the Sum expended for the Maintenance of Agent, an 
American born, who sees and feels the worth of Liberty, has tasted its Pleasures, and is 
Expectant of enjoying its future happy Fruits, is well appropriated.”76 To Pitkin, 
Johnson’s American identity was more important than his status as a trans-Atlantic 
figure. As Johnson wrote in 1769, “the controversy is not…between the prince and the 
subject, but between subject and subject, between the people of America and the people 
of Britain, which shall have the power over American property in the very important 
point of taxation.”77 The idea that there are “people of America” and “people of Britain” 
emerged during this time period and became more acute in the aftermath of the American 
Revolution.  
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“The true Christian is unconsistent with modern Patriotism”78 
 One reason Johnson was able to so easily adapt into English society—a factor 
which should not be neglected—was his membership in the Church of England. As an 
Anglican, he had a wide breadth of contacts amongst the upper echelons of society. He 
was unimpressed, however, by the general lack of religiosity in the Church.79 Perhaps this 
is why his closest friendships and most personal correspondence were with Dissenters, 
such as the Moravian Church at Fulneck. The rise of this church was part of the larger 
Evangelical revival movement in Britain and on the Continent, and Johnson’s Moravian 
friends conducted some of the first large-scale missionary work. One friend also set off 
for India as a writer with the East Indian Company, and another was in the Army. 
Johnson’s closest friend was perhaps the minister Benjamin LaTrobe, who was also 
extremely pro-government and favored coercion rather than conciliation with the 
colonies. Generally historians have considered the elite Anglican clergy to be the most 
coercive, and Dissenting clergy to be more pro-American, but this was not necessarily the 
case.80 In America, although most loyalists were Anglican, the church was the most 
divided denomination and most laypeople supported independence.81 Johnson’s Anglican 
ties may have been part of the reason he was not able to fully support independence, but 
it was not the only reason.  
Johnson’s British friends, particularly LaTrobe, bemoaned the fate that befell him 
as tensions mounted and he was no longer in a favorable position to receive lucrative job 
offers from the Crown—for being an American, as Latrobe saw it. As late as 1775, 
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LaTrobe praised Johnson: “If all thought as Dr. Johnson, we should soon be in peace and 
harmony…Britain would make conciliatory measures if they believed that there were not 
leading men on the other side of the Atlantic who aim at more than an exemption of 
taxation by a British Parliament.”82 LaTrobe understood, as did Johnson, that the 
Continental Congress was now calling for outright independence rather than 
representation in Parliament.  
LaTrobe and the other Moravians thought Johnson too good a Christian for the 
politically dangerous times he found himself in. Although he received repeated offers 
from patriots such as Silas Deane to join the Continental Congress, Johnson refused. To 
LaTrobe, he wrote that he felt there would be little room in Congress for “Moderate Men 
or Moderate Measures and with no other will I be Concerned.”83 Like Ingersoll before 
him, he was labeled a Loyalist for his moderate policies and unwillingness to make a 
final break with Britain. Unable to fully take part on either side, Johnson holed himself 
up in his Stratford home, isolated from all of his former colonial friends. In 1779, when 
the British threatened to bombard the town, his neighbors appealed to Johnson for help, 
asking him to negotiate with General Tryon. In some sense this episode recaptured the 
role Johnson played for much of his career: that of intermediary and go-between. As 
much as he was an outsider in the community because of his loyalist affiliations, he was 
also valued for his transnational connections. For the authorities, however, those 
connections made him a threat. In response to his agreement to petition on behalf of the 
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town, the Connecticut Council of Safety took him into custody and forced him to swear 
an oath of allegiance to secure his release.84  
 
His political future looked dim, but fortunately Connecticut suffered 
comparatively little upheaval in its transition from colony to state, and colonial officials 
such as Governor Trumbull—contemporaries of Johnson—remained in power throughout 
the war. It was essential for loyalists to have “powerful friends within revolutionary 
society” to support them after the war.85 Even so, it is surprising that Johnson managed to 
take such an illustrious place in the new state government after his ignoble wartime past. 
In fact, only by recalling his prewar service in London could Johnson regain the trust and 
support of Connecticut voters, and “it seems ironic that the Susquehannah controversy, 
which had tried his patience and imperiled his political support so many times before the 
war, occasioned his return to public life.”86 Conflict had broken out between Connecticut 
and Pennsylvania over disputed territory, but this time the Privy Council would not be 
adjudicating. In 1782, the state of Connecticut appointed Johnson as one of three agents 
to represent the state’s claim—in Congress. Although Connecticut lost the case, it did not 
end the controversy, and evidently Johnson advocated so well on the state’s behalf that in 
1785 they elected him to Congress. He helped draft the Connecticut Compromise and 
signed the Constitution, his reacceptance into society complete. Later biographical 
sketches of his life and career would make no mention of his wartime record or define 
him as a loyalist in official lists and records.  
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Yet strictly speaking, Johnson was a loyalist during the war, although perhaps his 
actual ideology was too complex for simple labels. Elizabeth McCaughey, his biographer, 
comes to the conclusion that he was “committed to American liberty and British rule, still 
convinced that no malign ministerial conspiracy had rendered the two incompatible.”87 It 
may very well be true that, from his experiences with Parliament, Johnson did not believe 
there was a large scale attempt to deprive the colonies of their liberties. The widespread 
belief in the colonies, however, was that there was a malign ministerial conspiracy, with 
the king either unable or unwilling to control Parliament. Therefore, conciliation could no 
longer be possible. Although Johnson himself recognized that Parliament was reacting in 
the moment, unsure of how to best handle the situation and convinced in their own minds 
that they were right, his letters back to Connecticut do occasionally give the impression 
that the British government was no longer governed by liberty, and that Americans would 
have to unite, receiving no help from Britain, to preserve these liberties. Johnson’s 
correspondence, ironically, proved far more radical than he was. It is interesting to note 
that from the extant collection that we have, his letters to friends in Britain stop sometime 
during the 1780’s, when Johnson began to reintegrate into society and took part in 
Connecticut politics once again. The content of his letters also shifted to concerns 
regarding Congress and Columbia University. Even in the politicized environment of 
post-revolutionary Connecticut, Johnson was well respected because he took part in “the 
social community of polite letters” and his letters represented “the republican 
ideal…connected to the struggle for liberty.”88 This transformation from a trans-Atlantic, 
imperial figure to a local state politician is symbolic of the transformation of the entire 
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Atlantic world. Johnson was in many ways the last of his kind. He had achieved one 
major success as an agent, however: he had left England in 1771 after—probably much to 
his surprise—winning the Mohegan case in Connecticut’s favor.  
In 1795, Jeremy Belknap from the Massachusetts Historical Society contacted 
Johnson to ask his permission to publish his correspondence with the governors of 
Connecticut. His refusal—and reasons why—are illuminating: “[the letters] were 
generally written in much haste, as I accidentally heard a friend was going out, or a ship 
would sail at short notice…they must therefore unavoidably contain many trifling articles 
of intelligence, many insignificant remarks, many crude observations, must in a word be 
in all respects extremely incorrect and totally unfit for the public eye.”89 This is 
somewhat disingenuous—Johnson may have been worried partly because he did not 
always tow the patriot line in his letters. With respect to his modesty, however, that is 
precisely why they are so interesting to historians. Johnson did indeed make many 
insightful and accurate observations, but because his letters are unedited we can get a 
glimpse of genuinely held beliefs and sincere—if ultimately unsuccessful—efforts to 
mediate the growing conflict without resorting to propaganda.  
From his correspondence with the Connecticut governors we can better grasp how 
local colonial elites acted as intermediaries between the London bureaucracy and colonial 
governments. From his friendships with British radicals like Nicholas Ray we can see 
how British and American thinkers exchanged ideas and support, as well as where they 
fundamentally disagreed. The integration of the Atlantic community is represented 
through his contacts with missionaries and merchants, including Benjamin LaTrobe, the 
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father of another famous migrant, American architect Benjamin Henry LaTrobe. Finally, 
we can also better understand the conflicting loyalties and dilemmas faced by many of 
the agents when Johnson formed friendships with both Patriot and loyalist Americans.  
Further research still needs to be done on this topic, particularly concerning the 
experiences of people not captured as thoroughly as elites such as Johnson in the 
historical record. Women, enslaved people, and immigrants were also trans-Atlantic 
figures. The numerous people in early America who did not share ideological ties to 
Britain, such as Native Americans and European immigrants, also complicate questions 
of national identity. Looking at their integration into the American body politic is beyond 
the scope of this essay. Yet by looking particularly at the colonial agents historians can 
shed light on the shaping of identity for Anglo-American elites. Johnson’s letters, written 
at a time of crisis, tell the story of the destabilization of the British Atlantic world and the 
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